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ABSTRACT
We develop a novel optimization model to maximize the prot of a
Demand-Side Platform (DSP) while ensuring that the budget uti-
lization preferences of the DSP’s advertiser clients are adequately
met. Our model is highly exible and can be applied in a Real-
Time Bidding environment (RTB) with arbitrary auction types, e.g.,
both rst and second price auctions. Our proposed formulation
leads to a non-convex optimization problem due to the joint opti-
mization over both impression allocation and bid price decisions.
Using Fenchel duality theory, we construct a dual problem that
is convex and can be solved eciently to obtain feasible bidding
prices and allocation variables that can be deployed in a RTB seing.
With a few minimal additional assumptions on the properties of
the auctions, we demonstrate theoretically that our computation-
ally ecient procedure based on convex optimization principles
is guaranteed to deliver a globally optimal solution. We conduct
experiments using data from a real DSP to validate our theoretical
ndings and to demonstrate that our method successfully trades
o between DSP protability and budget utilization in a simulated
online environment.
KEYWORDS
Demand-Side Platforms; Real-Time Bidding; Online Advertising;
Optimization
1 INTRODUCTION
In targeted online advertising, the main goal is to gure out the best
opportunities by showing an advertisement to an online user, who
is most likely to take a desired action, such as ordering a product
or signing up for an account. Advertisers usually use the service of
companies called demand-side platforms (DSP) to achieve this goal.
In a DSP, each individual advertiser sets up a list of campaigns
that can be thought of as plans for delivering advertisements. For
each campaign, the advertiser species the characteristics of the
audience segments that it would like to target (e.g., males, ages 18-
35, who view news articles on espn.com) along with the particular
media that it would like to display to the target audience (e.g., a
video ad for beer). In this work we will call an impression type
to a specic collection of those aributes (e.g., male, California,
interested in sports). In addition, the advertiser species a budget
amount, time schedule, pacing details, and performance goals for
each campaign. e performance goals typically can be specied
by minimizing cost-per-click (CPC) or cost-per-action (CPA).
e DSP manages its active campaigns for many dierent ad-
vertisers simultaneously across multiple ad exchanges where ad
impressions can be acquired through a real-time bidding (RTB)
process. In the RTB process, the DSP interacts with several ad ex-
changes where bids are placed for potential impressions on behalf
of those advertisers. is interaction happens in real time when an
ad request is submied to an ad exchange (which may happen, for
example, when a user views a news story on a webpage). In this
scenario, the DSP needs to oer a solution to decide, among the
list of all campaigns associated with its advertiser clients, which
campaign to bid on behalf of and the bid values.
e advertisers who work with the DSP expect its budget to be
spent fully or at least in an adequate amount as their marketing
areas count on it. Failure to do so may motivate an advertiser to
stop working with the DSP in the future, which is unacceptable
for its business. In addition, they would like their budget to be
spend smoothly if possible. en, the DSP faces the problem of
maximizing its prot while ensuring an adequate budget spending
for its advertisers clients.
DSPs can charge their clients using several pricing schemes, for
example in a CPM format advertisers are charged a xed amount per
thousand of impressions showed to users (which is mostly used for
branding of products). If the advertisers are interested in some click
or action of interest, they may pay in CPM scheme, but requiring
that no more than certain amount per click or action of interest is
paid (action of interest could be lling a form, purchasing a product,
etc.). In this work, we we will assume that the DSP gets paid only
when a click or action of interest occurs, but has to pay to the ad
exchanges for each impression it acquires. is is a challenging
payment seing as the DSP may have a negative operation if the
actions or clicks of interest don’t occur at the rates the DSP expects.
It is important to mention that DSPs usually receive millions of
ad requests opportunities per minute, and their bidding systems
needs to respond to each of this ad request in maer of milliseconds
making most companies apply simple heuristics to bid in the RTB
systems. To simplify notation we will assume in this work that the
advertisers are interested in clicks of interest, while this work apply
in general to any action of interest.
As a nal remark ad exchanges may use dierent auctions types
to sell advertisement opportunities. As an example, several ad
exchanges such as OpenX, AppNexus have announced that they use
rst price auctions, i.e. the highest bidder pays the ad exchange the
amount it oered, while others like Google’s AdX have announced
that they use second price auctions which is that the highest bidder
pays the second highest bid submied to the ad exchange. is add
an extra layer to any general DSP optimization algorithm that may
want to bid in dierent ad exchanges for the same advertisers.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to maximize the DSP
prot while ensuring an adequate budget spending for its advertis-
ers clients. We take into account that the DSP may bid in dierent
ad exchanges who may use dierent auction rules. Appropriately
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modeling the impression arrival, auction, and click/action processes
our non-convex model gives as an output bidding and allocation
vectors that can be used in real time by a DSP to bid in RTB envi-
ronments. To solve our model we propose a dual formulation using
Fenchel conjugates and derive a two-phase primal-dual procedure
to solve our non-convex problem. We show that the solutions given
by our solution procedure are optimal for several rst and second
price auctions, results that up to our knowledge are novel in the
literature. Experimental results show how our methodology is able
to trade o DSP protability for beer budget spending for rst
and second price auctions in synthetic data, and data based on a
real DSP operation.
Due to space limitations we only review works very close to ours,
and of those who we take ideas from. In terms of nding biding
and allocation schemes dierent schemes have been suggested in
the literature from the ad exchange point of view [1, 3, 6], and from
the DSP side [4, 9]. In terms of spending the advertisers budget
adequately [8, 12] set smart pacing strategies. Strategies for bidding
using Lagrangian schemes for DSPs have appeared [10, 13] and who
use the Ipinyou dataset to validate their results [14] as us. Here we
formulate a dual problem using the concept of Fenchel conjugates
[2, p. 91], which we solve using standard subgradients methods.
Our results are similar in spirit to the recent work [11]. e laer
studies a non-convex multi-agent optimization problem and also
uses Fenchel conjugates to construct a dual problem. Our work
diers from the laer as we are able to obtain stronger theoretical
results in comparison to [11] using the structure of the online
advertising problem studied here (which makes our proofs unique).
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we de-
scribe the notation and problem statement and we set up the model.
Section 3 show our proposed optimization problem. In Section 4 we
propose a dual for our problem of interest, showing several proper-
ties of it and proposing a two-phase primal-dual scheme. In Section
5 we show important optimality results and propose two-phase
primal-dual scheme to solve our problem of interest. Experimental
results using the Ipinyou data [14] are presented in Section 6, and
we mention some future work directions. Section 7 is the appendix
which has the proofs to all propositions and theorems shown in
this work.
2 MODEL FOUNDATIONS
Let us begin by describing the basic structure and ow of events in
the model. Let K denote the set of all campaigns associated with
advertisers managed by the DSP. e DSP interacts with several
ad exchanges, and recall that each auction held by one of these ad
exchanges represents an opportunity to show an ad to a particular
impression (i.e., a user). Although there may be billions of possi-
ble impression opportunities each day, we assume that the DSP
uses a procedure for mapping each impression opportunity to an
impression type. Let I denote the set of all such impression types.
Whenever an opportunity for an impression of type i ∈ I arrives
to one of the ad exchanges, the DSP has to make two real-time
strategic decisions related to the corresponding auction: (i) how
to select a campaign k ∈ K to bid on behalf of in the auction, and
(ii) how to set the corresponding bid price bik . If the DSP wins
the auction on behalf of campaign k , then the DSP pays the corre-
sponding market price (which depends on the auction type) to the
ad exchange, and an ad from campaign k is displayed to the user.
e advertiser corresponding to campaign k is charged only if the
user clicks on the ad.
Key Parameters for Impression Types and Campaigns. Our model
presumes that the DSP has knowledge (or estimates) of the follow-
ing parameters:
• si is the expected number of impressions of type i that will arrive
during the planning horizon.
• mk is the (advertiser selected) budget for campaign k during the
planning horizon.
• Ik denotes the set of impression types that campaign k targets.
(Note that each advertiser can create multiple campaigns to
achieve dierent targeting goals.)
• qk > 0 is the CPC (cost per click) price for campaign k , i.e., the
amount charged to the associated advertiser each time a user
clicks on an advertisement from campaign k .
Auction Modeling. We take a exible approach to auction model-
ing. In particular, we simply presume that, for each impression type
i ∈ I, the DSP has constructed the following two bid landscape [5]
functions (which include rst and second price auctions):
• ρi (b) – the probability of winning an auction for an impression
of type i ∈ I given that the DSP submied a bid of b.
• βi (b) – the expected amount the DSP pays the ad exchange,
conditional on the DSP winning the auction with a submied
bid of b.
We will assume ρi (b) and βi (b) to be non-decreasing functions, and
βi (b) ≤ b for all b ≥ 0 and i ∈ I.
Click Events. Whenever an ad of campaign k ∈ K is shown to
an impression of type i ∈ I (aer the DSP wins the corresponding
auction), we presume that a click event happens with probability
θik . In other words, θik is the expected click-through-rate. In ad-
dition, given an impression type i ∈ I and a campaign k ∈ K , let
rik denote the corresponding expected revenue earned by the DSP,
which is the same as the expected cost per impression (eCPI) to the
advertiser. Namely, it holds that rik := qkθik where qk is the CPC
price dened earlier.
Decision Variables and Additional Notation. When the DSP has
the opportunity to participate in an auction for an impression of
type i ∈ I it needs to decide which campaignk ∈ K to bid on behalf
of and the bid value to submit. Let E ⊆ I×K denote the edges of an
undirected bipartite graph between I and K , whereby there is an
edge e = (i,k) ∈ E whenever campaign k targets impression type
i , i.e, E := {(i,k) : i ∈ Ik }. Let Ki := {k ∈ K : (i,k) ∈ E} denote
the set of campaigns that target impression type i . For each edge
(i,k) ∈ E, we dene two decision variables: (i) xik the probability
that the DSP selects campaign k , and (ii) bik the bid value to submit
to the auction. Interpreted dierently, xik represents a proportional
allocation, i.e., the fraction of auctions for impression type i that are
allocated to campaignk on average. (e fraction of impression type
i auctions for which the DSP decides to not bid is 1 −∑k ∈Ki xik .)
Note that bik represents the bid price that the DSP submits to an
auction for impression type i conditional on the fact that the DSP
has selected campaign k for the auction. Let x, b ∈ R |E | denote
vectors of these quantities, which will represent decision variables
in our model.
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Let us also dene some additional notation used herein. For a
given set S and a function f (·) : S → R, let arg maxx ∈S f (x) denote
the (possibly empty) set of maximizers of the function f (·) over
the set S . If f (·) : Rn → R is a convex function then, for a given
x ∈ Rn , ∂ f (x) denotes the set of subgradients of f (·) at x , i.e., the
set of vectors д such that f (y) ≥ f (x) + дT (y − x) for all y ∈ Rn .
Finally, let [·]+ be the function that returns the maximum between
the input and 0, and ′ denote a derivative in the right context.
3 OPTIMIZATION FORMULATION
Let us begin by recalling the model developed in [6] (proposed only
for second price auctions there), which aims to maximize the prot
of the DSP under budget constraints:
max
x,b
∑
(i,k )∈E
[rik − βi (bik )]sixikρi (bik )
subject to
∑
i ∈Ik
riksixikρi (bik ) ≤ mk for all k ∈ K (1)
0 ≤ bik ≤ b¯i for all (i,k) ∈ E∑
k ∈Ki
xik ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I
xik ≥ 0 for all (i,k) ∈ E
e rst set of constraints above specify that the expected budget
spent by each campaign should be less than the total available
budget. e second set of constraints bounds the range of the
bid prices, and the third and fourth set of constraints ensure that
x represents a valid probability vector when restricted to each
impression type. e objective function is the expected DSP prot,
which we aim to maximize. Indeed, note that for each pair (i,k) ∈
E the quantity rik − βi (bik ) is the expected prot earned by the
DSP whenever an ad of campaign k is show to an impression of
type i , and sixikρi (bik ) is the expected number of impression of
type i that we will acquire on behalf of campaign k . erefore,
[rik − βi (bik )]sixikρi (bik ) is the expected prot due to bidding for
impressions of type i on behalf of campaign k , and summing these
quantities over all pairs (i,k) ∈ E yields the total expected prot
for the DSP, which we call pi (x, b).
Notice that the previous formulation does not ensure or even
encourage an adequate budget spending for the campaigns, it only
ensures that each campaign does not spend in expectation more
than its total budget. In reality, advertisers are not satised by
merely ensuring that their spending on each campaign is below the
specied budget level. Rather, most advertisers view the budget
valuemk as a “target” and may have complex preferences regarding
their spending behaviors. For example, an advertiser may be very
dissatised with underspending behavior and may in fact prefer
slightly overspending above the budget valuemk instead of severely
underspending well belowmk .
In order to greatly enhance the exibility of our model as well
as its ability to capture complicated budget spending preferences,
we replace the budget constraints in (1) with a more general utility
function model as follows. First, note that the expected total spend-
ing of campaign k ∈ K , as a function of the decision variables, is
given by vk (x, b) :=
∑
i ∈Ik
riksixikρi (bik ). Now, let uk (·) : R+ → R
be a concave utility function describing the budget spending pref-
erences of campaign k , whereby uk (vk ) is the “utility” of campaign
k when its expected spending level is vk . Furthermore, dene the
vector of expected spending levels v(x, b) ∈ R |K | whose kth coor-
dinate is vk (x, b), and let u(·) : R |K | → R be the overall budget
spending utility function whereby u(v(x, b)) = ∑k ∈K uk (vk (x, b)).
Finally, as an extra way to simplify notation let’s dene the feasible
set of allocation and bidding variables:
S :=
(x, b) :
∑
k ∈Ki
xik ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I, 0 ≤ bik ≤ b¯i for all (i,k) ∈ E, x ≥ 0

We are now ready to state our proposed optimization model:
F ∗ := max
(x,b)∈S
∑
(i,k )∈E
[rik − βi (bik )]sixikρi (bik ) + u(v(x, b)) (2)
Note that problem (2) is non-convex, and in Section 4 we propose a
computationally ecient procedure based on convex duality. We
nish this section by showing three examples of utility functions
that illustrate the improved generality and exibility of model (2).
Examples of Utility Functions
(1) Formulation (1) may be recovered as a special case of the more
general problem (2) by leinguk (·) be the (extended real valued)
concave function such that uk (vk ) equals −∞ if vk is strictly
greater thanmk , and 0 otherwise.
(2) If we want to maximize the DSP prot but also try to enforce an
appropriate target spending for a campaign k ∈ K , we can take
uk (·) to be the concave function such that uk (vk ) equals −∞ if
vk is strictly greater thanmk , and − τk2 ‖vk −mk ‖22 otherwise.
Here τk ≥ 0 is a user dened penalization constant.
(3) If we want to maximize the DSP prot while requiring both
a minimum and maximum expected spending for campaign
k ∈ K , we can take uk (·) to be the concave function such that
uk (vk ) equals −∞ if vk is strictly greater than mk or strictly
less than αkmk , and 0 otherwise. Here, the parameter αk ∈
[0, 1] is user dened and represents the minimum percentage
of expected budget spending.
Note that the model (2) allows for each campaign to have its own
distinct utility function uk (·), and therefore the three examples
above may be combined together across the dierent campaigns,
for example. Finally, note also that the separable structure of the
utility function u(·), whereby u(·) = ∑k ∈K uk (·), is actually not
needed for all of the results that we develop herein. Indeed, the
only crucial assumption about u(·) is that u(·) is a concave function.
However, the separable structure is quite natural and all of our
examples do have this separable structure as well, so for ease of
presentation we present the model in this way.
4 DUAL OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM AND
SCHEME
We begin this section with a high-level description of our approach
for solving (2). Our algorithmic approach is based on a two phase
procedure. In the rst phase, we construct a suitable dual of (2),
which turns out to be a convex optimization problem that can be
eciently solved with most subgradient based algorithms. A so-
lution of the dual problem naturally suggests a way to set the bid
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prices b. In the second phase, we set the bid prices using the previ-
ously computed dual solution then we solve a convex optimization
problem that results when b is xed in order to recover allocation
probabilities x. A very mild assumption we make for the rest of the
paper is that F ∗ > −∞, otherwise there would be no optimization
problem to optimize.
As we mentioned before we have assumed that our utility func-
tion u(·)is concave, therefore −u(·) is a convex function and we
can dene p(·) : R |K | → R its convex conjugate as p(λ) :=
supv ∈R|K |
{
λTv + u(v)} which is a convex function. e Fenchel
Moreau eorem [2, p. 91] ensures thatu(v) = infz∈RK
{
p(z) − zTv}.
Using the laer we can re-write our primal problem as (here we
use pi (x, b) := ∑(i,k )∈E [rik − βi (bik )]sixikρi (bik )):
F ∗ := max
(x,b)∈S
F (x,b) :=
{
pi (x, b) + inf
λ∈RK
(
−λTv(x, b) + p(λ)
)}
For a given λ ∈ R |K | we will dene the dual function as:
Q(λ) := sup
(x,b)∈S
(
pi (x, b) − λTv(x, b)
)
+ p(λ)
And the dual problem as:
Q∗ := min
λ∈R|K |
Q(λ)
en, the following inequalities hold for our primal and dual for-
mulations (they follow from the max-min inequality [2, p. 238]):
Q(λ) ≥ Q∗ ≥ F ∗ ≥ F (x,b) for all λ ∈ R |K | , (x, b) ∈ S
Let’s now dene hi (z,b) := (z − βi (b)ρi (b) the expected prot the
DSP receives from showing an ad of campaign k to an impression
of type i which has an expected revenue of $z when submiing
a bid of value $b. en, given a xed λ ∈ R |K | the dual function
Q(λ) can re-dened as:
Q(λ) := maximize
(x,b)∈S
∑
k ∈K
∑
i ∈I
hi (rik (1 − λk ),b)sixik + p(λ)
Proposition 4.1 (Efficient computation of Q(λ)). Given a
dual variable λ, an optimal solution (x(λ), b(λ)) for the dual function
Q(λ) can be found using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Computing (x(λ), b(λ)) ∈ argQ(λ) for a xed λ
Input: λ ∈ R |K | .
1. For each (i,k) ∈ E, set:
b(λ)ik ← arg max
b ∈[0,b¯i ]
hi (rik (1 − λk ),b), and
pi (λ)ik ← hi (rik (1 − λk ),b(λ)ik )si
2. For each i ∈ I, pick k∗i ∈ maxk ∈Ki {pi (λ)ik } arbitrary. Set x(λ)ik =
0 for all k ∈ Ki , k∗i , and if pi (λ)ik∗i > 0 make x(λ)ik∗i = 1
otherwise x(λ)ik∗i = 0.
Output: (x(λ), b(λ)) .
eorem 1 shows that the dual problem can be solved in a parallel
fashion, and furthermore nding b(λ) can be a simple operation.
For example, in the case of a second price auction it is known
that [rik (1 − λk )]+ ∈ arg maxb ∈[0,b¯i ] hi (rik (1 − λk ),b), and some
examples for rst price auctions have nice close forms as shown
in the next section. Being able to solve Q(λ) eciently is of great
importance as it is a core component to nd a subgradient of Q(λ)
as the following theorem shows:
Proposition 4.2. Given λ ∈ R |K | the output of Algorithm 2 is a
vector д ∈ ∂Q(λ).
Algorithm 2 Computing a subgradient of Q(λ)
Input: λ ∈ R |K |
1. Obtain (x(λ), b(λ)) ∈ arg maxQ(λ) using Algorithm 1.
2. Obtain p′ ∈ ∂p(λ)
3 Set:
д(λ) ← p′ −v(x(λ), b(λ))
Output: д(λ) ∈ ∂Q(λ) .
Notice that with STEP 1. in Algorithm 1 we can recover bidding
prices b(λ) from dual variables λ ∈ R |K | . e nal eorem of
this section shows that for xed bidding prices b is easy to obtain
allocation probabilities x by solving problem (2).
Proposition 4.3. For xed bidding prices b, problem (2) is a con-
vex problem.
Proposition 4.3 tell us that we could use a sub-gradient method
to nd to nd an allocation vector x given a xed b. Beer than the
previous, depending on the utility function used (2) can have a nice
structure, for example for the utility function examples shown in
the previous section, examples 1. and 3. transform problem (2) in a
linear program and example 2. in a quadratic problem. Problems
that could be solved directly using solvers like Gurobi [7]. We
nish this section by presenting Algorithm 3 which formalize our
approach to solve problem (2).
Algorithm 3 Two Phase primal-dual Scheme
Phase 1: Solve the Dual problem.
Solve minλ Q(λ) to near global optimality
using a subgradient method obtaining dual variables λˆ.
Phase 2: Primal Recovery
1. For all (i,k) ∈ E do:
bˆik ← arg max
b ∈[0,b¯i ]
hi (rik (1 − λk ),b)
2. Using bid prices b(λ) solve (2) obtaining allocation
probabilities xˆ.
Output: Feasible primal solution (xˆ, bˆ).
5 ZERO DUALITY GAP RESULTS
Algorithm 3 can always be used as long as the parameters and
functions of problem (2) are well dened. Here we we will go further
and show that our dual formulation and dual scheme are the right
methods to solve (2). In particular, we have strong duality results
which to the best of our knowledge are novel and have important
applications to rst and second price auctions by showing optimal
bidding prices to be used in an RTB environment. ese will be
derived from the following theorem:
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Theorem 5.1. If for all i ∈ I we have that ρi (·) and βi (·) are
dierentiable and:
• ρ ′i (b) > 0 for all b ∈ [0, b¯i ].
• дi (b) = (ρi (b)βi (b))
′
ρ′i (b) is strictly increasing for all b ∈ [0, b¯i ].
for all i ∈ I, then for any λ∗ ∈ arg max
λ∈R|K |
Q(λ), we have F (b∗, x∗) =
Q(λ∗) for any (x∗, b∗) ∈ arg max
(b,x)∈S
Q(λ∗).
Notice that eorem 5.1 ensures that no duality gap exists, but
furthermore for an optimal dual variable λ∗ it gives a form of the
variables (x∗, b∗) such that F (x∗, b∗) = Q(λ∗). Also, notice that the
second condition of the theorem is a form of diminishing returns.
Applications of eorem 5.1
(1) If for all i ∈ I their auctions are second price and ρi (·) is a
strictly increasing function in [0, b¯i ], then eorem 5.1 holds.
Also, for an optimal dual variable λ∗ optimal bidding prices are
b(λ)ik = [min{b¯i , rik (1 − λ∗k )}]+ for all (i,k) ∈ E.
(2) If for all i ∈ I all auctions are rst price auctions or more
generally scaled rst price auctions in which the winning DSP
pays an α ∈ (0, 1] percentage of the bid it oered, eorem
5.1 holds when ρi (·) is a strictly increasing twice dierentiable
concave function. Example of the later are: 1) ρ(b) = bc+b for
some xed c > 0, 2) square roots and logarithms, 3) ρ(·) repre-
senting the cumulative distribution function of an exponential
or logarithm-exponential random variable.
(3) If for all i ∈ I all auctions are rst scaled price auctions withα ∈
(0, 1] in which for each impression i there is a xed numberni ≥
1 of other DSPs who bid independently asUni f orm(0, b¯i ), then
eorem 5.1 holds. Furthermore, for an optimal dual variable λ∗
optimal bidding prices are b(λ)ik =
[
min
{
b¯i ,
ni rik (1−λ∗k )
α (ni+1)
}]
+
for all (i,k) ∈ E.
(4) Any combination of the above, or cases in which each impres-
sion type satises the conditions of eorem 5.1.
We nish this section by making three important comments.
First, to obtain the form of the optimal bidding prices is only needed
to solve arg maxb ∈[0,b¯i ] hi (rik (1−λ∗k ),b). In many cases, like second
price auction, this will have a close form, but for many others the
DSP can have tables with approximate solutions that can be used
instead of solving the problem in real time. Second, many ad-
exchanges use what are called hard reserve prices that consider
a bid valid only if it is higher than the reserve price. is poses
a problem for eorem 5.1 as the condition of ρ(·) being strictly
non-decreasing would not be true. If the impression types had xed
hard reserve prices this is not a major issue as we can change the
model to bid between the reserve price and b¯i (if the reserve price
were higher than b¯i wouldn’t bid for that impression type). In the
case that hard reserve prices change dynamically, heuristics could
be used, e.g. considering bidding in real time only only for those
campaigns with bid values higher than the reserve price, puing
levels of reserve price as a eld in the impression types, and others
which we don’t explore here. ird, it can be proven that eorem
5.1 guarantees that Algorithm 3 would converge to an optimal
solution for (2) as we get beer λ solutions of the dual problem. For
space reasons we don’t extend on this topic here.
6 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
Here we present computational results using the Ipinyou DSP data
[14] to which we applied our two-phase solution procedure compar-
ing its performance w.r.t. a greedy heuristic. e way we suggest
and apply in our experiments an allocation and bidding variables
(x, b) in a practical RTB environment is shown in Policy 4 and the
heuristic to which we compare our method is shown in Policy 5.
e Greedy Heuristic is optimal for the case of innite budgets
Policy 4 Online Policy Implied by (x,b)
Input: Allocation and bidding variables (xˆ, bˆ) and a new impres-
sion arrival of type i ∈ I.
1. Sample a campaign k˜ ∈ Ki according to the distribution
implied by the values xik for k ∈ Ki or break with probability
1 −∑k ∈Ki xik (i.e. choosing no campaign). If some campaigns
have depleted its budget adjust the probabilities to take this fact
into account.
2. Enter bid price bˆik˜ . If the auction is won, then pay the ad
exchange the amount is asking. If the auction is not won, then
break.
3. Show an ad for campaign k˜ . If a click or action of interest
happens, then deduct qk˜ from the budget of campaign k˜ and earn
revenue qk˜ .
Policy 5 Greedy Policy
Input: New impression arrival i ∈ I.
1. Bid for a campaign k ∈ Ki with remaining budget bigger than
qk with the highest rik value.
and second price auctions (is easy to extend it to arbitrary auction
types). As an important remark our method should be used in a real
DSP operation inside a Model Predictive Control Scheme, which
calls Algorithm 3 as budgets get used and dierent model inputs
gets updated as time progresses.
e public available Ipinyou data [14] contains information about
real bidding made by the chinese DSP Ipinyou in 2013. It contains
dierent features including the bidding prices of the impressions
for which Ipinyou bid for, and the price paid by Ipinyou to the ad-
exchange in case an impression was won and if a click or conversion
occurred (we did not use conversion data). Ipinyou assumes that
ad-exchanges use second price auctions. e data is already divided
in train and test sets and it has been used to test bidding strategies
for DSPs [10, 13] but we haven’t found a paper that use it for both
bidding and allocation strategies, reason why we compare to the
Greedy Heuristic 5. Ipinyou data is divided in three dierent time
periods in 2013, of those we decided to use the third as in the rst
there is no information about the campaigns Ipinyou bid for, and in
the second Ipinyou assumed that all impression types could serve
all campaigns which make the impression-campaign graph non-
interesting. e third season contains 3.15M of and 1.5M logs of
impressions won by Ipinyou in the train and test set resp. in behlaf
of four advertisers, which have 2716 and 1155 clicks associated to
them. Here we use the dierent advertisers as our campaigns.
To create “impression types” we divided the impressions by the
visibility feature which has a strong correlation with CTR, and then
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by the regions, homepage url, and “width x height” of the ad to
be shown (features that appear in all impression logs). e last
three features have a high dimensionality, for example homepage
url have 54,108 unique urls. For that reason we created mutually
exclusive sets of the form all urls that were targeted only by adver-
tiser 1, all that were targeted only by advertisers 1 and 3, etc. With
this technique we partition all impressions for which Ipinyou bid
for in 160 clusters of impressions which we used to create our nal
partition of 23 impression types. Of those 19 corresponds to the
clusters with a minimum of 30,000 impressions won in the train set
and the 4 le are the union of all clusters having dierent visibility
aribute (we grouped together the second, third, fourth and h
view as if they were the same visibility type). Our nal graph is
composed of 4 campaigns, 23 impression types, it has 43 edges, and
the dierent CTR were taken as the empirical rates for each combi-
nation of (impression type, advertiser). Using only the impressions
won in the train set for each impression type i we ed a beta
distribution using the python Scipy package (imposing the location
parameter to be equal to zero) to obtain parameters to estimate the
bid landscape functions (the ρi (·) function is just a function call,
but the βi (·) function was estimated using Monte-Carlo). Finally,
we count the times each impression type appears in the test set to
create the si values, and the budgets correspond to the total amount
of money that Ipinyou paid for the impressions assigned to each
advertiser in the test set. To simulate a real time environment we
used the empirical train CTR to train our models and the greedy
heuristic (we took the average CTR per impression for the pairs
of (impression type,advertiser) that appear less than 5000). To test
our model we use the impressions won by Ipinyou in the actual
order saving their impression type. en, one by one we read each
impression log and we assume that the impression was won if the
proposed bid for it is higher than the amount Ipinyou paid for it. A
click for the proposed advertiser occurs with probability equal to
the empirical CTR from the test data for the pair (impression type,
advertiser). We tried the utility functions 1. and 2. from Section 3,
using τk = 1/mk for all k ∈ K for second one.
Results. Our results are shown in Figure 1. Here we dene budget
utilization (b.u.) as the percentage of the total budget that was used
at the end of one simulation, and u.f. stands for utility function. We
performed two experiments. e rst was to see the sensitive of
our model w.r.t. to the budget. We tried 1/32, 1/8, 1/4, 1/2 and 1/0
of the budgets Ipinyou used for each advertiser in the test data and
we run 100 simulations for each seing obtaining average prot
and b.u. Our results are all relative to the average prot and b.u.
obtained by using the greedy heuristic. What makes one simulation
dierent from the other is that the CTR is a random variable. In
the second experiment we multiply the penalization parameters
tauk = 1/mk that appear in the u.f. 2 by 0.1, then by 0.3, and so
on until 2.1 running 100 simulations in each case obtaining the
average prot and b.u. All our results are relative to the average
prot and b.u. of the u.f. 1. and we also include the average results
from the greedy heuristic for comparison. Our results show that
our methodology works very well for cases in which the budget
is tight, but when is not the case the greedy heuristic is a good
alternative. From our second experiment we can see that a beer
b.u. utilization can be obtained at the cost of having a worst prot
(it can even be negative).
Relative Prot
(Perc./Met.) 1/32 1/8 1/4 1/2 1.0
U.F. 1 2.10 1.38 1.08 0.92 1.21
U.F. 2 1.83 1.34 0.94 0.76 0.8
Relative Budget Utilization
(Perc./Met.) 1/32 1/8 1/4 1/2 1.0
U.F. 1 0.95 0.88 0.8 0.95 1.07
U.F. 2 0.84 0.94 1.07 1.10 1.38
Figure 1: Two-phase policy vs. greedy policy
Let us conclude this section by mentioning a few directions for
future research. It would be very valuable to perform experiments
in which impressions are auctioned in both rst and second price
auctions and in which the cardinality of the impression types and
campaigns are higher. Also, several of the quantities we assume as
known in this work are hard to estimate in practice. We will study
robust approaches to our model.
7 PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS AND
THEOREM 5.1
In this appendix we will make use of the following denitions which
for space we skip in the main text (we use them in the proofs of
Proposition 4.2 and eorem 5.1):
Denition 7.1. • e set of feasible bidding and allocation vari-
ables for a given impression type is:
Si :=
(xi ,bi ) ∈ R |Ki | × R |Ki | : bi ∈ [0, b¯i ] |Ki | ,
∑
k ∈Ki
xik ≤ 1,xi ≥ 0

• e expected amount campaigns spend in impressions of type
i is vi (x, b) ∈ R |K | which is a vector whose k ∈ K coordinate
takes the value of riksixikρi (bik ) if (i,k) ∈ K and 0 o.w. en,∑
i ∈I vi (x, b) = v(x, b).
• e contribution of the dierent impression types in the dual
function is separable, and therefore given a xed dual variable
λ ∈ R |K | we dene for each i ∈ I:
ψi (λ) = max(xi ,bi )∈Si
∑
k ∈Ki
hi (rik (1 − λk ),bik )sixik
• Let’s dene the prot from impressions of type i in the objective
from impression of type i in (1) aspii (x, b) = ∑k ∈Ki hi (rik ,bik )sixik ,
and therefore
∑
i ∈I pii (x, b) = pi (x, b).
Notice that for any i ∈ I both vi (x, b) and pii (x, b) depend only
in (xi ,bi ) ∈ Si , but we decide to use this notation to not carry the
“
∑
i ∈I” everywhere.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. For xed λ we have that p(λ) is a constant, then we need
to focus only on the maximization part ofQ(λ). For any xed x′ ≥ 0
we have:
max
(x′,b)∈S
∑
k ∈K
∑
i ∈I
hi (rik (1 − λk ),bik )six ′ik =∑
k ∈K
∑
i ∈I
max
bik ∈[0,b¯i ]
hi (rik (1 − λk ),bik )six ′ik
Take (i,k) ∈ E arbitrary and assume x ′ik ≥ 0, then any b(λ)ik ∈
arg maxb ∈[0,b¯i ] hi (rik (1−λk ),bik )si is an optimal bidding price for
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the pair (i,k) independent of the value of x ′ik which proves STEP
1. of Algorithm 1. Fixing b = b(λ), we can use that for each i ∈ I
we have
∑
k ∈Ik xik ≤ 1 and xik ≥ 0 for all (i,k) ∈ E are the only
constraints for x (w.r.t. to impression type i), therefore is optimal
for each impression type i ∈ I to bid only for a campaign that
maximizes the prot we can get from it. If for an impression type i
there is no campaign k ∈ Ki which gives us a positive prot, then
is optimal to not bid for that impression type. at’s exactly what
STEP 2. of Algorithm 1 concluding the proof. 
7.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. Here we assume λ ∈ R |K | x. Notice that using the
denitions from Denition 7.1 we have Q(λ) = ∑i ∈I ψi (λ) + p(λ).
We are going that to show that for any (x(λ), b(λ)) ∈ arg maxQ(λ)
and any λ′ ∈ R |K | we haveψi (λ′) ≥ ψi (λ)−vi (xi (λ),bi (λ))T (λ′−λ).
e previous is enough to nish this proof as ∂Q(λ) = ∂∑i ∈I ψi (λ)+
∂p(λ) = ∑i ∈I ∂ψi (λ)+∂p(λ) and ∑i ∈I vi (xi (λ),bi (λ)) = v(x(λ), b(λ)).
Let λ′ ∈ R |K | be any dual variable dierent from λ (if not the fol-
lowing set of equations are trivial), and let i ∈ I arbitrary, then:
ψi (λ′) = max(xi ,bi )∈Si
∑
k ∈Ki
(
rik (1 − λ′k ) − βi (bik )
)
ρi (bik )sixik
= max
(xi ,bi )∈Si
∑
k ∈Ki
(
rik (1 − λk ) − rik (λ′k − λk ) − βi (bik )
)
ρi (bik )sixik
≥
∑
k ∈Ki
hi (rik (1 − λk ),bik (λ))sixik (λ)
−
∑
k ∈Ki
(λ′k − λk )rikρi (bik (λ))sixik (λ)
≥ψi (λ) −vi (xi (λ),bi (λ))T (λ′ − λ)

7.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. Assume b xed. e domain of F (b) is a set of linear
constraints, then we only need to proof that the objective function
is concave. Clearly the summation part of the objective function
is linear and therefore concave, then is only le to show that the
utility function part is concave. e laer is true as v(·, b) is an
ane function in term of the allocation probabilities, therefore
u(v(·, b)) is the composition of a concave and ane function and
therefore concave. 
7.4 Proof of eorem 5.1
is proof uses the terminology dened in Denition 7.1 and we
can assume ρi (·) and βi (·) to be continuous functions for all parts
in this proof as it is a weaker condition than being dierentiable
which is part of the hypothesis of eorem 5.1. We will start by
showing that if we assume ρi (·) and βi (·) to be continuous for all
i ∈ I, then we can obtain the explicit form of the sub-dierential
∂Q(λ) for any xed λ ∈ R |K | (Lemma 7.2). Result that we combine
with Lemma 7.3 to prove Lemma 7.4. e later results will help us
prove that if there exists an optimal dual variable λ∗ that satises
a condition we call “Unique Solution” (Denition 7.5), then there
is no duality gap (Lemma 7.6). Finally, we will prove eorem 5.1
by showing that when the hypothesis of the theorem holds, then
the “Unique Solution” condition hold for any feasible lambda λ (i.e.,
p(λ) < ∞), and therefore for any optimal dual variable.
Let’s rst dene S∗i as the set of optimal solutions forψi (·) given
λ ∈ RK for some i ∈ I, i.e. S∗i (λ) := arg max(xi ,bi )∈Si
ψi (λ), and S∗ =
S∗1 (λ) × . . . S∗|I |(λ).
Lemma 7.2. (Equivalent to Lemma3.3 in [11])e sub-dierential
of the dual function is
∂Q(λ) = conv
{
−
∑
i ∈I
vi (x, b) + y
 (xi ,bi ) ∈ S∗i (λ),y ∈ ∂p(λ)}
Proof. Let’s dene ϕi (λ, (xi ,bi )) := pii (xi ,bi ) − λTvi (x, b) for
each i ∈ I. en, ψi (λ) = max(xi ,bi )∈Si
ϕi (λ, (xi ,bi )), and ϕ(·, ·) is dif-
ferentiable w.r.t. to its rst argument, ϕ(·, ·) is a continuous function
w.r.t. both of its arguments, and ∂ϕ/∂λ is a continuous function
w.r.t. to its second argument for all λ. en, Danskin’s eorem
says ∂ψi (λ) := conv{−vi (x, b)| (xi ,bi ) ∈ S∗i (λ)}. Finally, using that
Q(λ) = ∑i ∈I ψi (λ) + p(λ) we obtain the desired conclusion. 
Lemma 7.3. If there exists λ∗ optimal dual variable, such that
v(x∗, b∗) ∈ ∂p(λ∗), for some (x∗, b∗) ∈ S∗(λ∗), thenQ(λ∗) = F (x∗, b∗).
Proof. Using that Q(λ∗) = Q∗, the optimality of (x∗, b∗) and
the denition of F (x, b) we have:
F (x∗, b∗) = pi (x∗, b∗) + inf
λ∈RK
{
p(λ) − λTv(x∗, b∗)
}
Q(λ∗) = pi (x∗, b∗) + p(λ∗) −v(x∗, b∗)T λ∗
We will show that F (x∗, b∗) = Q(λ∗) by proving
inf
λ∈RK
{
p(λ) − λTv(x∗, b∗)
}
= p(λ∗) −v(x∗, b∗)T λ∗
Let’s dene the convex function ζ (λ) := p(λ) − v(x∗, b∗)T λ, then
(д −v(x∗, b∗)) ∈ ∂ζ (λ∗) for any д ∈ ∂p(λ∗). By hypothesis it exists
д′ ∈ ∂p(λ∗), such that д′ − ∑i ∈I vi (x∗i ,b∗i ) = 0 then, using the
subgradient inequality:
ζ (λ) ≥ ζ (λ∗) + (д′ −v(x∗, b∗))T (λ − λ∗) = ζ (λ∗)
Which shows that λ∗ is a minimizer of ζ (·) concluding the proof. 
Lemma 7.4. If there exists λ∗ optimal dual solution, such that the
sets Vi := {vi (x∗, b∗)|(x∗i ,b∗i ) ∈ S∗i (λ∗)} are convex for all i ∈ I,
then it exists (x∗, b∗) ∈ arg maxQ(λ∗), such that F (x∗, b∗) = Q(λ∗).
Proof. IfVi is convex by denition we haveVi = conv(Vi ) for
all i ∈ I which would imply ∂∑i ∈I ψi (λ) = ∑i ∈I Vi . Lemma 7.2
tells us −∂∑i ∈I ψi (λ) + ∂p(λ∗) = ∂Q(λ∗), and by the optimality of
λ∗ we have that 0 ∈ ∂Q(λ∗). Using the convexity of theVi , there
exists (x∗i ,b∗i ) ∈ S∗i (λ∗) for all i ∈ I and д ∈ ∂p(λ∗), such that if we
call (x∗, b∗) = ((x∗1 ,b∗1), . . . , (x∗|I | ,b∗|I |)) we have v(x∗, b∗) = д and
then Lemma 7.3 holds. 
Denition 7.5 (Condition: Unique Solution (US)). We say that the
dual variable λ satisfy the unique solution condition if
arg maxb ∈[0,b¯i ] hi (rik (1 − λk ),b) is a singleton whenever λk < 1
for all (i,k) ∈ E.
7
Lemma 7.6 (Uniqe Solution). Assume βi (b)ρi (b) > 0 for all
b ∈ (0, b¯i ], then if λ∗ is an optimal dual solution that satises the
Unique Solution condition, then there exists (x∗, b∗) ∈ arg maxQ(λ∗)
such that Q(λ∗) = F (x∗, b∗).
Proof of Theorem 7.6. Let λ∗ be an optimal dual solution that
satises the Unique Solution condition. Our goal here will be to
show that setsVi from Corollary 7.4 w.r.t. to λ∗ are convex for all
i ∈ I which would conclude this proof. Let I = I ′ ∩ I ′′ with I ′
the set of impression types such thatψi (λ∗) > 0 for all i ∈ I ′, and
i ∈ I ′′ if ψi (λ∗) = 0. Notice that we can assume rik > 0 for all
(i,k) ∈ E as if it weren’t case for some (i,k) ∈ E it would be optimal
to make xik = 0 in our primal problem (1) and the edge could have
been removed from the problem denition. en, using the laer,
the continuity of functions ρi (·) and βi (·) and that ρi (b)βi (b) > 0
for all b > 0 and i ∈ I an impression type i is in I ′′ if and only if
λk ≥ 1 for all k ∈ Ki , and bik (λ∗k ) = 0 is the unique maximizer of
max
b ∈[0,b¯i ]
hi (rik (1 − λ),b) for all k ∈ Ki . For this case we have:
Si (λ∗) =
{
(xi ,bi ) ∈ Si
 xikbik = 0 if λ∗k = 1
xikρi (bik ) = 0 if λ∗k > 1
}
en, the setVi from Lemma 7.4 is a convex set for any i ∈ I ′′ as
it would be equal to the convex hull over a nite amount of points.
is is easy to see as the kth coordinate of any of its vectors is equal
to 0 if λ∗k > 1 or ifk < Ki , and ifk ∈ K∗i and λ∗k = 1 the general form
of thekth coordinate of its vectors is rikρi (0)sixik and
∑
i ∈Ki xik ≤
1 with xik ≥ 0 for all k ∈ Ki . For i ∈ I ′ there is at least one
k ∈ Ki with λk < 1 which implies hi (rik (1 − λ∗k ),bik (λ∗)) > 0
(the implication follows from the continuity of the bid landscape
and βi (b) ≤ b for all b > 0 and i ∈ I). Let’s dene K∗i ⊆ Ki as
K∗i := arg maxk ∈Ki
{
hi (rik (1 − λ∗k ),bik (λ∗k ))si
}
for all i ∈ I ′, then for
any i ∈ I ′:
Si (λ∗) =
{
(xi ,bi ) ∈ Si
 ∑
k ∈K∗i
xik = 1, xik = 0 for all k < K∗i ,
bik = bik (λ∗k ) for all k ∈ K∗i
}
MakingVi a convex set for all i ∈ I ′. 
Now we will use Lemma 7.6 to prove eorem 5.1 concluding
this section.
Proof Theorem 5.1. First notice that the second condition of
eorem 5.1 implies that βi (b)ρi (b) > 0 for all i ∈ I. Let ρ(·) and
β(·) denote arbitrary bid landscape functions and [0, b¯] the bidding
range for an arbitrary impression type. Let r > 0 arbitrary represent
and expected revenue, then for any b ∈ (0, b¯] we have:
∂h(r ,b)
∂b
:= h′(r ,b) = ρ ′(b)(r − д(b)) =

h′(r ,b) > 0 if д(b) < r
h′(r ,b) < 0 if д(b) > r
h′(r ,b) = 0 if д(b) = r
Notice that ρ ′(b) > 0 by hypothesis so h′(r ,b) sign is directly
related to the term (r −д(b)). Let’s use that д(·) is strictly increasing
in (0, b¯] and dene bˆ(r ) := lim inf{b ∈ (0, b¯] : д(r ) > r }. en,
b∗(r ) = arg max
b ∈[0,b¯]
h(r ,b) is equal to:
b∗(r ) =
{
b¯ if д(b¯) ≤ r
bˆ(r ) o.w.
e previous can be understood in very simple words, given that
д(·) is strictly increasing in (0, b¯] if д(b¯) ≤ r , then is optimal to
bid the maximum possible which is b¯ as h′(r ,b) is always strictly
positive in (0, b¯]. If д(b) ≥ r for all b > 0 then h′(r ,b) < 0 for all
(0, b¯] and therefore is optimal to bid 0 and by denition we would
have bˆ(r ) = 0. Finally, if neither of the previous cases occurs it
means that there was a change of sign of h′(r ,b) in (0, b¯] making it
optimal to bid the value in which the change of sign occurs which
is bˆ(r ). Here we need to use lim inf in the denition of bˆ(r ) as д(·)
is not necessarily continuous. Notice that bˆ(r ) always exists and is
unique by denition. Notice that we have proven that the Unique
Solution would hold for any dual variables, and therefore for any
optimal dual variable λ∗. en, by Lemma 7.6 holds we conclude
this proof. 
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